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ABSTRACT
This note reexamines the theory of optimal public
enforcement when litigation costs are incurred if the
defendant is prosecuted at trial, and when an out-of-court
settlement is possible. Using a numerical example, it is
shown that settlements and litigation costs can
substantially alter the optimal system of public
enforcement. It is also shown that failing to take these
considerations into account can significantly lower the












Economic analyses of optimal public enforcement examine the enforcement
authority's choice of the probability of detection and the level of the
penalty.[l] The authority's problem is to choose the probability and the
penalty so as to maximize social welfare. Two implicit assumptions are made
in these analyses: first, that all violators who are detected areprosecuted
at trial; and second, that the prosecutor's and the defendant's litigation
costs are zero.[2] Each of these assumptions is substantiallycontrary to
fact.
The overwhelming majority of all violators who are caught are not
prosecuted at trial, but rather settle out of court. For example, over ninety
percent of all criminal cases are disposed of in this way through the process
of "plea bargaining;" similarly, most civil cases brought by administrative
agencies are disposed of without resorting to trial. [3]
To some extent, the propensity to settle out of court is due to thehigh
cost of litigating cases that go to trial. In private civil litigation, there
is evidence that the parties' litigation costs can exceed the amount received
by a successful plaintiff. [4] Litigation costs associated with public
enforcement also are likely to be high, in part because of the high standard
of proof that often must be met (as, for example, in criminalprosecutions).
The contribution of this note is to incorporate these two "real world"
facts- -settlements and litigation costs- -intothe model of optimal public
enforcement, and to examine their implications for the choice of the
probability of detection and the level of the penalty. A simple model of
public enforcement with these features is presented in section 2. Some
numerical calculations are then performed in section 3.[5)
12. The Model[6J
Individuals are assumed to be risk neutral and identical, except for the
private gain they obtain from engaging in an activity which imposes harm on
others. If an individual undertakes the activity, he faces some probability
of being caught. If he is caught and the case goes to trial, he will incur
litigation costs and, with some probability, will be found liable and have to
pay a fine.(The model easily could incorporate nonmonetary sanctions.)
Alternatively, the individual may settle out of court. An individual will
engage in the activity if his private gain exceeds his expected payment- -the
sum of the expected defense cost (i.e., the defense cost times the probability
that he is caught and the case goes to trial), the expected fine (the fine
times the probability that he is caught and loses at trial), and the expected
out-of-court settlement (the settlement amount times the probability that he
is caught and the case settles out of court).
Both the probability of an out-of-court settlement and the amount of the
settlement are assumed to be exogenous.[7] This assumption is made in order
to focus on the effects of these considerations on the optimal probability of
detection and on the optimal level of the penalty.
The following notation will be used to describe the individual's problem
more precisely:
g—gainto an individual from engaging in the activity,
h(.) —probabilitydensity of gain among individuals,
g'—maximumpossible gain,
p —probabilitythat an individual who engages in the
activity will be caught,
r —probabilitythat an individual who is caught goes
to trial,
2q —probabilitythat an individual who goes to trial is
found liable,
f —finecollected from an individual who is found liable,
b —costof defense if an individual goes to trial,
s —settlementpaid by an individual who settles out of
court.




In other words, an individual will engage in the harmfulactivity if his gain
exceeds his expected payment, E(.). His expectedpayment can be decomposed
into three parts: the expected fine, prqf; the expected defensecost, prb; and
the expected settlement, p(l-r)s.
Also, let:
N(p,f) —numberof individuals who engage in the activity,
e —externalcost or harm from engaging in the activity,
n(p,f) —numberof individuals who are caught (—pN(p,f)).
There are two types of costs borne by the public enforcementauthority- -
detectioncosts and prosecution costs. Let:
c(p,N) —costto the enforcement authority of catching
fraction p of those individuals who engage in
the activity.
Detection costs are assumed to be increasing in bothp and N (c1(.) >0,c2(.)
>0).Thus, for example, if the number of violations is one thousand, it is
more costly to catch one hundred violators (with p —. 1)than it is to catch
ten violators (with p —.01).And it is more expensive to catch 10 percent of
a million violators than it is to catch 10 percent of a thousand violators.
3Finally, let:
a =costto the enforcement authority of prosecution. [81
It is assumed that there is no cost to the enforcement authority of imposing
fines.
Social welfare equals the sum of the gains to individuals who engage in
the activity less the harm they cause, less the cost of catching them, and







The problem of the enforcement authority is to maximize social welfare,
W, through the choice of the fine, f, and the probability of detection, p.
The optimal values of the variables will be indicated by asterisks.
Since an individual cannot pay more than his wealth, the maximum
effective fine equals the individual's wealth less his cost of defense. If
individuals are risk neutral and fines are socially costless to impose (as is




y —initialwealth of individuals.
The reason for this result is simple. If the fine were less than y-b, the
fine could be raised and the probability of detection lowered so as to keep
the expected payment of violators, E(.), the same. Social welfare would rise
because the cost of catching individuals would fall.
Given that f* —y-b,the optimal probability of detection is determined
by maximizing social welfare (3) with respect to p. Assuming an interior




The left-hand side of (5) is the marginal benefit of raising the probability
of detection, which equals the reduction in the number of individuals engaging
in the activity, -dN(.)/dp, times the harm caused by each net of their gains,
e-E(.).[lO] The right-hand side is the marginal cost of raising the
probability, which has two elements--detection costs and litigation costs.
The terms in braces represent the effects on detection costs. The first term,
c1(.), is the direct cost of raising the probability of detection, holding
constant the number of individuals engaging in the activity. The second term
in braces represents the savings in detection costs due to a reduction in the
number of individuals who undertake the activity. The final term is the
effect on litigation costs associated with the change in the number of
violators who are caught.[ll]
It is easy to see that settlements and litigation costs affect the
optimal system of public enforcement. Since f* —y-b,the optimal fine falls
as the defendant's litigation costs rise.
The effects of settlements and litigation costs on the optimal
probability are less obvious because a number of terms in the first-order
condition, (5), are affected. Everything else equal, the possibility of a
settlement lowers the expected payment, E(.), of an individual who engages in
the harmful activity, assuming that the settlement amount will be less than
his expected payout at trial (including his litigation costs). Thus,
settlements will tend to increase the number of individuals engaging in the
harmful activity, N(.), and the number who are caught, n(.). The possibility
5of settlement also will have the effect of decreasing average litigation
costs, r(a+b). Similarly, an increase in the litigation costs of the
defendant will increase the expected payment of someone who engages in the
harmful activity, which will reduce the number of individuals who choose to do
so. Also, an increase in the prosecutor's litigation costs will have a direct
effect on average litigation costs.
When all of these factors are taken into account, it is not clear whether
settlements and litigation costs will tend to increase or decrease the optimal
probability of detection, or by how much.
3. An Example
Although the preceding discussion shows that the optimal system of public
enforcement depends on the likelihood that a case will be settled and on the
costs of litigation if the case is tried, it does not suggest the magnitudes
involved. In this section, calculations of the optimal probability of
detection and optimal fine are performed using a special case of the more
general model. It will be shown that the fact that most cases settle and that
there are substantial litigation costs can significantly change the optimal
system of public enforcement. The importance of taking these considerations
into account will be measured by comparing the level of social welfare
achieved under optimal public enforcement to the level of social welfare that
would result if the probability and fine were set under the incorrect
assumption that all cases are litigated and that litigation costs are zero.
It will be assumed in this section that the probability density of gains,
h(.), is uniform between 0 and g', and that the cost of detection function,
c(p,N), is given by c1p +c2N,where c1 and c2 are positive constants.[12]
6Given these assumptions, it is not difficult to show that theoptimal





(7) dE(.)/dp —rqy+(l-r)s÷ rb(l-q).
Calculations were made using plausible values for theparameters given in
equations (6) and (7). Specifically, let:
y (wealth) —$20,000,
g' (maximum gain) $12,000,
e (harm) —$ 5,000,
q (probability of liability at trial) —0.5,
c1 (marginal cost of p)[l3] —$1,500,
c2 (marginal cost of N) —$1,200,
r (probability of trial) —0.3.
While it is likely that fewer than 30 percent of allcases go to trial, this
choice of r reflects the fact that a large number ofcases are settled just
prior to trial, after substantial expenditures by bothprosecutor and
defendant.
In addition, let:
a (prosecutor's costs) —$2,500,
b (defendant's costs) —$2,500.
As noted in the introduction, there is evidence that the combinedlitigation
costs of the parties may exceed the victim's damages. The implicitassumption
here is that these values are equal.
For the reasons given in section 2, the optimal fine is set such that the
fine plus the defendant's cost of litigation equals his income.Thus,
7f* (optimal fine) —y
-b—$17,500.
The settlement amount is assumed to be midway between the prosecutor's
expected winnings at trial net of his litigation costs, and the defendant's
expected loss at trial including his litigation costs. Thus,
s (settlement amount) —qf+.5(b-a)—$8,750.
Finally, from (6),
p* (optimal probability) —.17.
Using the assumed values of the parameters and the optimal values of p and f,
the resulting level of social welfare is $571.
Now suppose that the probability and fine are set under the mistaken
assumptions that all cases go to trial and that litigation costs are zero. In
other words, suppose one were to choose p and f to maximize social welfare
assuming r —1and a —b—0.This would lead to a fine of $20,000 (although
in fact the injurer would not be able to pay this much) and a probability of
.31, nearly double the optimal probability of .17. In addition, actual social
welfare (using the true values of r, a, and b) would fall from $571 to $517,
more than a 9 percent loss. Thus, failing to take into account the
possibility of settlement and the presence of litigation costs can have a
substantial effect on the determination of the optimal system of public
enforcement and on the achievable level of social welfare.
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[1]See, for example, Becker (1968).
[2] Although some analyses of the court system do consider settlements
and litigation costs, these studies are not concerned with optimal public
enforcement. See, for example, Landes (1971).
[3] See, for example, Grossman and Katz (1983) and Posner (1970).
[4] For example (although perhaps an extreme one), a study of asbestos
litigation found that $1.71 is spent by the parties in litigation costs for
every $1.00 received by the plaintiff. See Kakalik (1983).
[5] The paper by Fenn and Veljanovski (1985) complements the analysis
presented here. Their focus is on explaining why, given prosecution costs, a
regulatory authority would accept a violator's promise to voluntarily comply
with the authority's regulations in the future.
[6] The model in this section is a generalization of the model used in
Polinsky and Shavell (1984).
[7] In models which focus on other issues, both of these assumptions
have been relaxed. See, for example, Bebchuk (1984) and the references cited
therein.
[8] This cost includes both the cost to the prosecutor's office and the
9court costs associated with a trial. The model does not distinguish between
these two institutions.
[9] This derivation uses the fact that h(E(.))[dE(.)/dp] —dH(E(.))/dp=
-dN(.)/dp,where H(.) is the cumulative distribution of h(.).
[10] The individuals who are deterred by the increased probability of
detection are those who were previously indifferent between engaging in the
activity or not; their gains equal the expected payment, E(.).
[11] Note that, depending on the sign of the right-hand side of (5),
the expected payment, E(.), may be greater than, equal to, or less than the
harm caused, e. Thus, an optimal system of public enforcement may be
characterized by "overdeterrence," in the sense that some individuals who are
deterred from engaging in the activity would have received gains greater than
the harm they would have caused (if e <E(.));or there may be
"underdeterrence," in the sense that some individuals who engage in the
activity obtain gains less than the harm they cause. These points were
recognized by Friedman (1981), although his model of public enforcement did
not include settlements and litigation costs.
[12] A linear cost function allows for a simple closed-form solution for
the optimal p. Such a cost function can be justified on the grounds that it
represents a first-order approximation to a more realistic multiplicative cost
function. Reasonable parameter values were chosen on this basis; see note 13
below.
[13] The values for the constants c1 and c2 were determined by starting
with the multiplicative version of the cost function c —kpN.To select a
reasonable value for k it was assumed that if all individuals were violators
(N —1),it would take one-half of the wealth of society (1/2 of $20,000) to
10catch all of them (p —1).This implies that k $10,000. Thus, for p .12
and N —.15,c1 —kN—$1,500and c2 —kp—$1,200.
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